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1

By BBNGT

HAEGGLUND

T

HB problem of the relation between Luther and the tradition
which derives its name from William of Occam 2 has in our
time acquired a new interest. Certain Roman Catholic critics
are inclined t0 ascribe the Reformer's heretical ideas to nominalist
inftuences. According to them nominalism bears within itself
a ferment of dissolution; it rejects in a radical manner the fundamental presuppositions of the whole scholastic theology. Is such
a view based on an accurate representation of nominalism? This
is a question which we cannot answer within the limits of the
present article. Much can be said in favour of the contention;
but it must not be forgotten that the theologians who may be
regarded as Luther's masters were not in any marked degree
innovators. In addition to William of Occam himself, there were
Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly and above all Gabriel Biel, professor at
Tilbingen, whom his contemporaries regarded as a great theologian.
They all kept rigorously within the framework fixed by the Church;
though their school met with some opposition at the outset, it
ended by becoming dominant in a "'hole chain of universities
that were among the most influential of the period.
There are other reasons as well that make a study of the relations
of Luther with occamism highly interesting. In spite of the extensive work that has been done on Luther's theology during recent
decades, this particular topic has received hardly any attention.
No doubt that is partly owing to practical difficulties in the way
of all research into nominalist theology. There are hardly any
recent editions of the works of the writers of this school, and their
theological method makes it difficult to get a general grasp of their
position. But it is worth while, even from a purely historical point
1 This anide was written originally by Bengt Hagglund for the French
periodical Positio11,s L,,1hlrie11,,.,, Oaober 1955. It was translated in10 English
by Dr. A. lL Vidler and appeared in the British m:1g:izine Tb~olo11, June 1956.
To the author, the rransl:1tor, and to both periodicah we are very grateful for
their kind permission to m:1ke this significant article accessible to our readers. W. lL llochrs, Managing Edi1or, CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.
2 To designate this tradition we sh:111 use the terms "occamism'" and '"nomiaalism" indifferently.
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of view, to inquire into the connexions between Luther and the
occamist tradition. Many of the Reformer's writings make use of
nominalist terminology and arc so closely bound up with the
questions raised by this school that, in some cases, it is impossible
to get hold <?f their meaning unless one is acquainted with their
scholastic background.
The best way to approach the subject is to compare those of
Luther's writings which depend on the nominalist uadition with
the works of the authors to whom he refers. It is no good being
content with generalities.
It is chiefly wich respect to two matters that Luther's theology
has been held to be in accord with that of the occamistS; the docuine of justification, on the one hand, and his conception of the
relations between theology and philosophy, on the other. It is on
these two questions that we shall concenrr:ue our attention.

I.

THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION

Occamist theology presupposes a double definition of justification.
According to the idea of the "regular power" (po1en1ia ordin11111)
of God, justification consists in the gift of his grace that God
bestows on the man who has known how to prepare himself for
it aright. Grace in this case abolishes sin and sanctifies the man;
we are then justified in consequence of a new (inner) condition
that grace has created in us. According to the idea of the "absolute
power" (potenria 11bsol111a) of God, however, the nominalists also
conceive of justification as the fact that God declares us righteOUS
solely on the ground that he freely accepts us, without regard 10
what we bring with us in the way either of inherent grace or of
holiness.:a We may call this the doctrine of acceptance. Both these
lines of thought must be taken into consideration when a comparison is made between nominalist theology and Luther's. We
will first see what his attitude was to the usual occamist docuine.
Then we shall deal with the doctrine of acceptance.
From the very beginning of his polemic against nomioalism,
Luther takes his stand against the idea that there can be a-preparaa Cp. the excellent discussion of mis question by C. fedces, "Die llechtferri•
gungslehre des Gabriel Biel" (Miinsterische Beiui ge rur Tbeologie, fuc. 7),
1925.
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tion of man for grace. This does not mean that he attacks the
nomiruillsr system just at one particular point. Rather it means that
his conception of man and of grace is alcogcther different from that
of the nominalists.
According t0 occamism, man who is deprived of grace can pre-

pare himself in several ways co receive it. He can, for example,
renounce sin and love God above all things. He can also produce
a faith that prepares him for grace; he can accept the Christian
message when he hears it. These various preparations are summed
up in the idea that man ought "to do what is in his power" ("faccre
quod est in se"-which became a technical expression).
For Luther such a preparation is impossible on the level of
human nature. "On the part of man," he says, "nothing precedes
grace but an evil disposition, indeed nothing but rebellion against
grace."' 4 He explains this srate of affairs on psychological as well
as on theological grounds. In Luther's view the nominalist psychology is erroneous: it assumes that the will is capnble of submitting itself t0 the imperatives of reason and of conforming itself
to the truth once that is known - to the uuth, for example, that
God, being the supreme being, ought t0 be loved nbove all rhings.11
In Luther's view man is incapable of controlling his interior will.
No doubt his reason and his conscious will allow him to determine
his outward acts, but he remains powerless in face of his internal
impulses. They can be changed only by a stronger impulse, by
a new will. We recognize here Luther's basic conception according
to which unregenerate man is incapable of any good; he is the
"old man," the corrupt tree that brings forth corrupt fruit. He
cannot prepare himself t0 receive grace, because he is subject to
the rule of sin. When he "does what is in his power," it bears the
imprint of sin. All the good we are capable of comes from God.
It is the Lord who works in us both to will and to do (Phil. 2:13).
So Luther looks upon the idea that man, motivated by concupiscence
and bound in sin, could love God above all things as absurd and
blasphemous. Were it not so, man, who is bur dust and ashes,
4 "Es pane autcm hominis nihil nisi indispositio, immo, .rebellio grariae
gratiam praecediL" W.A. 1, 225, 29.
1 "Palsiw esr quod wluntu possit se conforawe dicwnmi recto natw'IWler,

Camra Seo. Gab." Iii'. A. 1, 224, 15.
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would have something of which to boast before God; then this
being whose ruuure is corrupt could merit divine grace. But befoie
God we are only sin and nothingness.0
Wh:u then is the truth about justification?
According to occamism, it takes place when God gives his grace
to him who, on the natural level, "does what is in his power."
Grace is instilled like a new quality which transforms the soul
and raises its virtues to 11 supernatural level. The infusion of grace
drives out sin aod abolishes transgression. Justification is then the
consequence at once of a condition of man and of a gift of God.
According to Luther, justification does not by any means spring
from a new quality in regenerate man. Groce does oot uansform
the soul nor does it exalt human nature. It is the divine mercy
that brings about the forgiveness of sins. As the Spirit of God
gives life, so grace confers that eternal life which is given us in
and with the forgiveness of sins. We are not justified by reason
of the new life which is in us, but by reason of the grace which
is in God. This means that righteousness comes to us from God
who imputes it to us by his grace. "Blessed is the man unto whom
the Lord imputeth not iniquity" (Ps. 32:2).
Luther's teaching here presents an obvious contrast to the or•
dinary teaching of nominalism about justification. The fact that
nominalism is marked by pelagian tendencies makes this conmst
greater than that which exisrs in a general way between the
Reformer's teaching and other areas of scholastic theology.
But when people speak of nominalist elements in Luther's
theology they have something else in mind. It is in fact the other
nominalist definition of justification that is considered to be the
model from which Luther copied his doctrine of imputation.
According to this second definition, man would be declared
righteous only because God accepts him as such quite apart from
any infusion of grace. We must therefore ask what Luther's attitude
was with regard to this second occamist doctrine ( the doctrine of
acceptance). While rejecting the current doctrine, did not Luther
• "Veriw icaque est quod homo arbor mala factu1 non pomt nisi malam
ftlle ft facere." IV. A. 1, 224, 13. ''Nisi quil ex spiriN sit
renatu:1
(sit quutopere coram se ft bomilu"bus iustuS, asrm, apiem), aro est, fttul homo ea.•
1, 146, 20. "Homo fttul, ftDiw 'f'IDiwum univeruque ftlliw." 1, 145, 29.
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adopt the theory of acceptance according to which God justifies
man by his absolute power without respect to the grace that is
instilled int0 him?
We have only to glance at Luther's criticisms of nominalism to
be convinced that he did nothing of the kind. Luther not only
iejecu the pelagianism of his predecessors; he equally criticizes
their theory of acceptance. According to him, a man's salvation
can be due to nothing but the grace and the mercy of God. On
the other hand, the idea that God could declare a man righteous
in an entirely arbitrary manner is, in his eyes, only a meaningless
formula, a bad joke. To admit that idea would be equivalent to
denying the very nature of grace. For grace is not a quality
inheient in man. It is the life-giving Spirit of God who really
makes man righreous by the forgiveness of sins and gives life to
those who are in a state of spiritual death.' It would follow from
the idea of acceptance that God declares righteous a man who is
only a natural man; a purely natural love for God would in that
case appear to be the equivalent of supernatural love. This conaption, so far from combating the pelagian tendency inherent
in nominalism, would only reinforce it by accentuating its rationalism and by reducing the role of grace in the work of salvation.
The nominalists do well to say that God declares the sinner righteous; but they deny the miraculous character of this justification.
For Luther, imputation is something other than the entirely
arbitraty choice of an absolute power. This term describes an
event big with consequences and essential in the divine order of
salvation. Imputation is nothing else but the work of grace. And
grace, instead of being the arbitrary will of God, works the justifiation of the sinner because of Jesus Christ. Acc.ptance means
that God declares a sinner righteOUS because he is all-powerful;
imt,Nl•lion means that God imputes to man the righteousness of
Christ by faith. Imputation docs not base salvation solely on the
all-powerfulness of God; it bases it on the fulfilment of the law
by Jesus Christ and on the infinite merits of the Saviour. To the
T ""Non pocest deus acccpcare hominem
sine
grad& Dei iustifiC"ante. Contra
Ota.m.'" W. A. 1, 227, 4. "'Gratia dei nunquam sic toexisrir ut oriosa. Sed est
"iYUS, mobilis et operosus spirirus, nee per Dei absoluwn porentiam fieri
poien. ut actus amicitiae sitpraesens
et gratia Dei
non sir. Contra Gab.'"
1,227, 1.
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arbitrary acceptance of nominalism the Reformation opposes irs
principle of "propter Chriscwn."
For Luther, the whole point is that it is the sinner who is justified.
The man of whom he speaks is not predisposed to salvation by any
natural love for God. On the contrary, only tbe sinner can be
justified. Only he who sees himself as God sees him - sinful,
corrupt and wretched- can become before God what he would
wish to be - righteous, good and pious. God's action operares in
an opposite direction to man's. He lifts up the humble, justifies
the sinner, gives life to the dead. That is wby men are required
to be humble and sincere and to see themselves as God sees them.
Only then can God act as he intends, and give righteousness
and life.8
The righteousness imputed to the sinner is by no means a declaration empty of real content. It is the very righteousness of God,
a "strange righteousness" (alie,ia insti#a) of which we become
partakers when God exchanges our guilt for the satisfaction
wrought by Christ. There is a sense in which the nominalist idea
of acceptance also means that it is the sinner who is justified. But
then this justification takes place on the ground of man's natural
virtue which the absolute power of God declares to be perfect
and supernatural. Punishment is remitted without any satisfaction
on man's part and the gift of virtue is conferred without infusion
of grace. On the other hand, with Luther it is a real righteousness
that becomes ours, although it is strange to us. By it alone we
become righteous. It is imputed to us in virtue not of an arbitrary
decision but of the faithfulness and mercy of God.

II. THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
Attempts have also sometimes been made t0 prove that Luther
was nominalist in his views concerning the relations between
theology and philosophy. The disparity that Luther sees between
these two disciplines is taken to correspond to the line of demarcation which nominalism draws between natural knowledge and
"Cum iusriria fidelium sit in Dco abscondira, pecc:arum
vero eorum
m:aaiin seipsis, verum esr, non nisi iusros damnari arque peccarores er
mereuices salvari."
W. A., 1, 148, 35. "In conspecru meo semper sum peccaror." 149, 1. "Scar firma senrenria: Qui voler iusrus fieri, peccaror fiar necase
est." 5, 195, 41. Cp. 7, 546 f.
8
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revelation. In both cases a new point of view will have mken the
place of that harmony between faith and knowledge which was
cbaractcristic of classical scholasticism. The ultimate consequence
of this conception is the theory of two kinds of truth.
But such an interpretation is too simple, and it fails to take
account of the real situation. Certainly there are points of conmct
between Luther and the nominalists here as well as in regard to
justification. There is. however, an essential theological difference
between them which is of capital importance.
What distinguishes theology from philosophy according to
ocarnisrn is the fact that the former has to do with revealed truths
which cannot be completely proved, whereas philosophy is concerned with knowledge that can be demonstrated with certainty.
To the question whether theology is entitled to be called a science,
occamism gives a negative answer. Note, however, that this answer
assumes a quite precise definition of what a science is. Only
axiomatic principles and syllogisms that can be deduced from them
arc entitled to be termed science (scientill) in what was then regarded as the proper sense of the word. Because theology issues
from diJfcrent presuppositions, the information it yields is outside
the field of philosophy or scientific knowledge.
At the same time, this clear line of demarcation between theology
and science is only one aspect of the occamist theory of knowledge.
Occamism also established very close links between the two spheres.
Aaually the scholastic method of presenmtion, which characterizes
its theology, shows that in practice it hardly establishes an impassable barrier between faith and reason. It seeks, moreover, by
considerations of principle to justify the rationalistic way of dealing
with theological questions. It supposes that certain theological
truths belong also to the sphere of philosophical knowledge; for
example, the doctrines of the existence and nature of God. The
clements of natural theology are thus within the scope of metaphysics. The fundamental conception that they have in common
is that of being. But in this case what is the distinguishing character
of theological truths properly so-called? Occam answers that, in
so far as such truths are contingent, they cannot be known with
certainty. To this class belong such propositions as "God createS"
or "God has become man." On the other hand, theological truths
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that are necessary, e. g., "God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit," can
tO some extent be the object of demonstrable knowledge. To be
sure, there is no direct perception of them, which is normally the
basis of this kind of knowledge. But perception is in this case
replaced by a divine intervention: revelation, which is accepted
by faith.
These examples show how occamism sought t0 forge links
between theological and philosophical knowledge and to make
room for theology in its general theory of knowledge. Not only
are certain theological truths accessible to reason, but those that
rest on a supernatural revelation can, after the event, become the
object of rational speculation. Theological knowledge is, so to
speak, on the same level as rational knowledge. The chief difference
between them is that the former presupposes revelation and faith,
faith being conceived as the submission of the will to the authority
of revealed truth. As we have already said, nominalism holds that
such a faith is possible on the natural level: man can produce it
by his natural powers. Free will is then capable of adhering to
truths of faith which ecclesiastical authority proposes to it.
Thus it is by starting from the theory of know ledge that occamism uies to solve the problem of the tension between faith and
reason. Theological propositions cannot be demonstrated; some
of them cannot be evidently known. They presuppose the submission of faith to authority. But, once these presuppositions are
admitted, reason can take hold of them and deal with them according tO its own laws. Therefore, although occnmism clearly distinguishes between theology and scientific knowledge, it postulates
an entire harmony between faith and reason. That is why it has
no difficulty in practising scholastic speculation on the content of
faith and even carrying it further.
Luther really followed the occamists in regard t0 theology and
philosophy. He also takes the separation of these two spheres as his
point of departure. For him as for his precursors the knowledge
that faith gives is of a different kind from that which reason gives.
It outreaches rational understanding ( mp,a 1'ationis cap1um), and
above all it presupposes the existence and experience of faith.
But when Luther says that you can only understand the Gospel in
temptation (in tier Sil11111ion dt1r Anfech111ng)1 he is undoubtedly
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol28/iss1/31
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ming his stand on other presuppasitions than those of the
aominalists. for whom knowledge through faith is of the same kind
as practical knowledge and depends on acceptance by the will of
• revealed truth. It is not, however, t0 be denied that there is
a certain
in thought between Luther and the nominalists
on this point. We meet in both the same conviction that theology
has for its object truths which are, in the final analysis, impenetrable
mysteries and that it is thereby distinguished from the profane
sciences. Still, Luther's point of view is not that of the nominalist
theologians. The best proof of this is that he broke radically with
all the rational speculation in theological matters which marked
the earlier tradition.
Luther sees in the tension between faith and reason something
other than a problem connected with the theory of knowledge.
For him this tension is primarily a theological problem. The
knowledge that faith gives is altogether inaccessible to reason, not
only because the natural intelligence is insufficient here, but chiefty
because human reason is blinded by original sin and it lacks that
spiritual light without which man is incapable of understanding
revealed truths. Reason is not only man's nntural way of thinking:
this term also denotes man's perverted attitude to things divine.
Reason bears the imprint of our carnal sentiments. Natural reason
is therefore an obstacle to faith. If it cannot understand the Gospel,
this is not only because of the supernatural character of faithknowleclge, but also because unregenerate man cannot rid himself
of his pervened attitude. In everything he does he seeks his own
interests. He tries to become righte0us in the sight of God by
good works which he produces. For a man to arrive at faith, his
rcason must first die and new light must be given him by the Holy
Spirit. He cannot produce this faith himself. His free will cannot
accept truths of faith. All is divine gift: not only the revelntion
as such, but also the faith that accepts the truth of revelation.
"God has convicted the wisdom of the world of foolishness." All
that belongs to man must be destroyed before God makes us partakers of the wisdom and spirirual knowledge that belong t0 faith.
These familiar notions are enough to show us that, for Luther,
the r:elations between faith and reason are closely connected with
the basic principles of his theology. This is the measure of the
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1957
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distance that separated him, at this point, from occamism. For
Luther this problem does not belong only to the sphere of the
theory of knowledge. The difference between faith and reason
must be studied on the b:isis of nn anthropology stamped with the
doctrine of original sin. For occamism reason is capable of understanding the content of revelation and making it an object of
speculation. According to Luther, on the other band, natural reason
must be annihilated before we can understand "the things of the
Spirit of God" (1 Cor.2:14).
It should not be concluded that Luther denied all activity, of
reason in the sphere of faith. It is only ncce s:iry to recall the part
reason plays in his famous words at \Vorms, nccording to which,
if he was to be made to reuact, he must be convinced by arguments
dmwn from the Scriptures or by mdubirable reasons (1'alion, ,wid, nte). Plainly, Luther also refers to reason where there is a question of understanding the content of revelation and of formulating
it theologically. But in this case it is the regenerate reason which
submits without hesitation to divine revelation. There is no question
of knowledge derived from natural reason being, so to spenk, completed by revealed knowledge. Rather, faith itself becomes for the
believer a new reason which Luther calls 1'ntio ,. 11ala or ratio {tdei.
We find, then, in Luther two different points of view on the
relations between reason and truths of faith. On the one h:ind he
can say that faith combines with reason and makes use of it. On
the other hand he presupposes that faith fights ngainst rea..con,
which must die and be annihilated in order that faith c:in arise
within us. In the former case he means the naturnl function of
reason as such; in the latter, the term "reason" denotes the perverted
and carnal state of mind as also the compromise with the world,
which are characteristic of the "old man."
Here is an exnmple that will illustrate what we have said above,
and" also show, in conclusion, how this theology sets Luther in
opposition to the nominalists.
In his "Disputation against Scholastic Theology" of 1517, Luther
attacks, among other things, the idea of a "special logic of faith"
(logic• fidei), which was approved by the nominalists. Here is the
text of his thesis on this subject: "It is in vain that one imagines
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol28/iss1/31

10

Haegglund: Was Luther a Nominalist?
WAS LtrrHER. A NOMINALIST?

451

a lo&ic of faith, a mppositio ,nediara beyond terms and number." 9
The addition, "against recent logicians," shows that he was criticizing conceptions that were current in nominalist drdes. Some advoaca of that system, in fact, thought that the rules of aristoteliao
logic could not apply to the doctrine of the Trinity without producing heretical conclusions. They applied the same principle to
other dogmas as well - for example, to certain parts of Christology.
We can see from several of Luther's disputations that he shared
this point of view. Nominalisrn, however, proposed to provide
a remedy for this incompatibility between logic and the Church's
dogmas by substituting for the current logic another logic. Its rules
'\\'OUld be brood enough to make it applicable to the sphere of faith.
That is what was called the "logic of faith.'' This is the best
possible example of the way in which the nominalist school separated chcology and science. In rejecting the idea of a particular
logic of faith, Luther shows duu he is critirol of the occamist
tradition. The idea of a logic of faith assumes that the mysteries
of faith can be enclosed within the rules of rational thinking.
Even if truths of faith are outside the sphere of properly philosophical knowledge, they arc, as it were, a posteriori subject to speculauon and scientific discussion. Luther's riticism involves the
outright rejection of traditional theological speculation. Further,
if the thesis cited above is to be explained in harmony with the
Reformer's fundamenml conceptions, it must be said that he sees
in the logic of faith a mixture of theology and science which he
felt bound to condemn. Truths of faith ought to be explained in
a manner different from profane knowledge. It is useless and yain
t0 v.iant co submit the mysteries of faith to the laws of reason.
Faith must not be submitted to reason; that is why no rule of logic
should be imposed on divine truth.
If the relation between occamism and Luther is considered only
on the ground of the theory of knowledge, then there seems to be
only a minimal difference between them, a nuance. But when the
theological meaning and the practical consequences of this differ"Fnuua fingitur logica fidei, supposicio mediaca crua cerminum et
Contra recences di:aleaicos."" W. A. 1. 226, 19. for the pcoblems
ia,olwd in dau cat, cp. Haeglund, Th•olo1i•
Philo1ophi• b•i Z..1bu ,.,,,
;,, Jw """•utudln Tr.Jilio11. Luads Universicea Amkrilt, voL 51:4, Lund,
1955, pp. 4J If.
1

IIIIIDffWIL
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ence are examined, it seems like n profound and pregnant transformation of all theological methodology and of Christian dogmatic
theology.
Lund, Sweden

THE LAW IN THB LIGHT OF THB GOSPEL

Under this heading the E11a11geli1ch-LN1hcri1cho Ki,chcnui1,mg
(February 1, 1957) offers a brief, but penetrating analysis of the Law
and the Gospel, based on Rom. 7:7ff. In the passage quoted, Paul, as
the writer says, uses the term v6~10; as a synonym of tv-co),11: "commandment." The I.nw consists of the commandmenrs which God
revealed and gave to His people. In the light of the Gospel the Law
appears as most intimately joined to the former. This intimate union
shows itself in the fact that the l.nw cries out for the Gospel. In themselves the divine commandments are peculiarly powerless. They cannot
awaken man to obedience or total dedication to God. The I.nw works
death. Nor is this inability of the I.nw merely a deplorable accidms,
but a part of the divine counsel of salvation. It is the weakness of the
I.nw that it must ay out for the Gospel. But it is the strength of the
I.nw that it renders this aying so necessary and urgent. In the service
of the Gospel the I.nw enables man to recognize his sin in its mosc
horrible manifestation. The I.nw drives sin out of its hiding. It judges
my self-love and proves that in my whole existence, both in my supreme
human heights and in my deepest inhuman depths, I am an irrec•
oncilable
enemy of God. But che I.nw is also so utterly weak that sin
may use it to urge man .to approach God as his partner on the ground
of his own fulfillment of His commandments. Therefore man remains
on the side of sin in all he does. The I.nw thus demonstrates mOSt
emphatically that it cannot be considered as a way to salvation.
JOHN THEODORB MUBLLER
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